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THE RIGHT TO APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL FOR THE
INDIGENT CIVIL CONTEMNOR FACING INCARCERA-
TION FOR FAILURE TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT
McBride v. McBride
I. INTRODUCTION
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States declares that no state shall
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law."' The effect of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment on an indigent 2 facing a possibility of
incarceration for civil contempt' due to a failure to pay child sup-
port arrearages was recently revisited by the North Carolina
Supreme Court in McBride v. McBride.4 Prior to McBride, the
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States reads:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
2. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-450(a) (1989). North Carolina's statutory
definition of an indigent states in the pertinent part: "An indigent person is a
person who is financially unable to secure legal representation and to provide all
other necessary expenses of representation in an action or proceeding
enumerated in this Subchapter." Id. See also State v. Hoffman, 281 N.C. 727,
190 S.E.2d 842 (1972) (An indigent is one who does not have available, at the
time they are required, adequate funds to pay a necessary cost of his defense).
3. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-21(a) (1986). North Carolina's civil contempt
statute reads in the pertinent part:
(a) Failure to comply with an order of a court is a continuing civil
contempt as long as:
(1) The order remains in force;
(2) The purpose of the order may still be served by compliance with
the order; and
(3) The person to whom the order is directed is able to comply with
the order or is able to take reasonable measures that would
enable him to comply with the order.
Id.
4. 334 N.C. 124, 431 S.E.2d 14 (1993).
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North Carolina Supreme Court, in Jolly v. Wright,5 stated that
due process in civil contempt cases for failure to pay child support
required appointment of counsel only if counsel was necessary for
an adequate presentation of the merits, or to ensure fundamental
fairness.6
In McBride, the court held that "principles of due process
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment require that, absent the
appointment of counsel, indigent civil contemnors may not be
incarcerated for failure to pay child support arrearages."7 The
court stated that in a civil contempt proceeding for nonsupport the
trial court is to determine the likelihood of the defendant contem-
nor becoming incarcerated.8 If the court determines the civil con-
temnor may be incarcerated as a result of the proceeding, the
court should query the defendant as to his desire for counsel and
his ability to pay for legal representation.' Should the defendant
desire counsel but be unable to pay for such representation, the
trial court must appoint counsel to represent him.10
This Note will provide a history of a civil contemnor's right to
appointed counsel in North Carolina by reviewing the statutory
and judicial history prior to McBride v. McBride, primarily
through a study of the North Carolina Supreme Court holding in
Jolly v. Wright. Next, this Note will look at the law outside of
North Carolina which effected the holding in McBride. Next, this
Note will examine the court's ruling in McBride, and discuss the
altered judicial reasoning which led to the court's holding.
Finally, this Note will address the ramifications of McBride, and
conclude with a discussion of the decision's effects and the ques-
tions it left unanswered.
II. THE CASE
On January 12, 1989, the defendant, Terry McBride, signed a
Voluntary Support Agreement in which he agreed to pay $40 a
week in child support." On that day, the agreement was
approved and signed by a district court judge, and thereby became
5. 300 N.C. 83, 265 S.E.2d 135 (1980).
6. Id. at 93, 265 S.E.2d at 143.
7. McBride, 334 N.C. at 131, 431 S.E.2d at 19.
8. Id. at 132, 431 S.E.2d at 19.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 125, 431 S.E.2d at 15. See infra note 12.
128 [Vol. 16:127
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a court order.12 On May 10, 1991, after Mr. McBride failed to
appear in court to respond to a motion to show cause why he
should not be held in contempt for the failure to pay child support
as per the January 12, 1989 order, the district court entered an
order for his arrest. 3 On June 7, 1991, Mr. McBride was brought
before the District Court, Davidson County, for a contempt hear-
ing.' 4 Mr. McBride was not represented by counsel at the con-
tempt hearing, and the issue of whether he was entitled to
appointed counsel because of indigence was not raised.' 5 Mr.
McBride represented himself, having neither requested, nor been
offered, counsel.' 6 The trial court found Mr. McBride in willful
contempt, and ordered him to be held in custody' 7 until he purged
himself'" of the contempt by paying the full amount of the child
12. McBride, 334 N.C. at 125, 431 S.E.2d at 15. The North Carolina child
support statute reads in the pertinent part:
In lieu of or in conclusion of any legal proceeding instituted to
obtain support for a dependent child from the responsible parent, a
written agreement to support said child by periodic payments executed
by the responsible parent when acknowledged . . . by a judge of the
district court ... shall have the same force and effect, retroactively and
prospectively, in accordance with the terms of said agreement, as an
order of support entered by the court, and shall be enforceable and
subject to modification in the same manner as is provided by law for
orders of the court in such cases.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-133 (1991).
13. McBride, 334 N.C. at 125, 431 S.E.2d at 15.
14. Id. Mr. McBride's hearing was one for civil, not criminal, contempt. In
Blue Jeans Corp. of Am. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 275 N.C. 503, 169
S.E.2d 867 (1969), the court noted that it is often difficult to distinguish between
civil and criminal contempt. The court said that the purpose of the power
exercised is a major factor, and where the purpose is to provide a remedy for an
injured suitor and to coerce compliance with an order, the contempt is civil, but
where the purpose is to preserve the court's authority and to punish for
disobedience of its orders, the contempt is criminal. Id.
15. McBride, 334 N.C. at 125, 431 S.E.2d at 15.
16. Id.
17. Id. The North Carolina civil contempt statute regarding imprisonment
provides in the pertinent part: "A person who is found in civil contempt may be
imprisoned as long as his civil contempt continues .. . ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-
21(b) (1986).
18. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-22(a) (1986). The statute declares that one held
for civil contempt must be released when his civil contempt no longer continues.
The order of the court must specify how one can purge oneself from contempt,
and upon compliance, the officer having custody may release the person without
a further order from the court. Id.
1994] 129
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support arrearages he owed, $1380.46.19 The trial court failed to
determine whether Mr. McBride was presently able to pay the
amount he owed.2 °
Mr. McBride remained in jail until July 2, 1991, when he gave
notice of appeal and was released pending his appeal.21 On appeal
Mr. McBride argued that, because he was indigent at the time of
the contempt hearing which resulted in his incarceration, the trial
court had violated his constitutional right to due process by failing
to appoint counsel to represent him.22 Following the reasoning of
Jolly v. Wright,23 the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed
the holding of the trial court, dismissing Mr. McBride's due pro-
cess argument.24
Mr. McBride filed a notice of appeal as a matter of right 25 to
the North Carolina Supreme Court,26 and additionally, was
granted discretionary review.27 The supreme court reversed the
decision of the court of appeals, holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment due process principles require that indigent civil con-
temnors may not be incarcerated for nonsupport without the bene-
fit of appointed counsel.28 Furthermore, the court stated that "[t]o
the extent that our decision in Jolly v. Wright29 is inconsistent
with this holding, that decision is overruled." 0
19. McBride, 334 N.C. at 125, 431 S.E.2d at 15.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 300 N.C. 83, 265 S.E.2d 135 (1980).
24. McBride, 334 N.C. at 125, 431 S.E.2d at 15.
25. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30(1) (1989). North Carolina's appeal of right
statute reads in the pertinent part:
"Except as provided in G.S. 7A-28, an appeal lies of right to the Supreme
Court from any decision of the Court of Appeals rendered in a case:
(1) Which directly involves a substantial question arising under the
Constitution of the United States or of this State . . .
Id.
26. McBride, 334 N.C. at 125, 431 S.E.2d at 15.
27. Id. at 125, 431 S.E.2d at 15-16.
28. Id. at 131, 431 S.E.2d at 19.
29. 300 N.C. 83, 265 S.E.2d 135 (1980).
30. McBride, 334 N.C. at 131, 431 S.E.2d at 19.
130 [Vol. 16:127
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III. BACKGROUND
A. Status of the North Carolina Law Prior to McBride: Jolly v.
Wright
The United States Supreme Court, in Gideon v. Wain-
wright,31 held that the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States,32 which is applied to the states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,33 requires the
appointment of counsel to indigent defendants in state felony tri-
als.34 In Argersinger v. Hamlin,35 the Supreme Court expanded
the holding of Gideon and ruled that the Sixth Amendment right
to appointed counsel attaches as a matter of law in any criminal
prosecution where a defendant may be imprisoned.36 However, in
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 7 the Court refused to adopt the "per se rule"
of Gideon and Argersinger-which requires appointed counsel as
a matter of due process-to all civil proceedings where the possi-
bility of incarceration exists. 38 The North Carolina Supreme
Court followed the reasoning of these federal decisions when it
handed down the Jolly v. Wright decision in 1980.39
31. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In Gideon, the Court declared it was overruling
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), which had held that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel did not extend to the states, and that a refusal to appoint counsel
for an indigent did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment unless the want of counsel under the particular circumstances could
result in a conviction "offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of
fairness." Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment reads:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id.
33. See supra note 1.
34. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 340.
35. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
36. Jolly v. Wright, 300 N.C. 83, 90-91, 265 S.E.2d 135, 141 (1980) (citing
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)).
37. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
38. Id. at 788. The Court in Gagnon stated: "We do not, however, draw from
Gideon and Argersinger the conclusion that a case-by-case approach to
furnishing counsel is necessarily inadequate to protect constitutional rights
asserted in varying types of proceedings ...." Id.
39. 300 N.C. 83, 265 S.E.2d 135 (1980).
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In Jolly, the North Carolina Supreme Court considered the
question of whether an indigent defendant facing incarceration
in a civil contempt proceeding brought to compel compliance
with a child support order4 ° had a statutory or constitutional
right to be represented by appointed counsel.41  The defend-
ant in Jolly asserted he had a right to counsel under
N.C.G.S. § 7A-451(a)(1), 42 as well as under the Due Process
40. North Carolina, under N.C.G.S. § 7A-451(a)(1), see infra note 42 (text of
the statute), requires the appointment of counsel for an indigent facing
incarceration in a criminal contempt proceeding for failure to comply with civil
child support orders. See Hammock v. Bencini, 98 N.C. App. 510, 391 S.E.2d 210
(1990). See also infra text accompanying notes 44-51 (the court in Jolly holding
that N.C.G.S. § 7A-451(a)(1) applies only to criminal cases). The difference
between criminal and civil contempt is that the purpose in criminal contempt is
to preserve the court's authority and to punish for disobedience of its orders,
whereas, in civil contempt, the purpose is to provide a remedy for an injured
suitor and to coerce compliance with an order. See supra note 14.
41. Jolly, 300 N.C. at 85, 265 S.E.2d at 138.
42. Id. N.C. GEN. Stat. § 7A-451(a) (1989) enumerates fifteen actions and
proceedings entitling an indigent to counsel. The statute provides:
(a)- An indigent person is entitled to services of counsel in the following
actions and proceedings:
(1) Any case in which imprisonment, or a fine of five hundred
dollars ($500.00), or more, is likely to be adjudged;
P (2) A hearing on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under
Chapter 17 of the General Statutes;
(3) A motion for appropriate relief under Chapter 15A of the
General Statutes if the defendant has been convicted of a
felony, has been fined five hundred dollars ($500.00) or more,
or has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment;
(4) A hearing for revocation of probation;
(5) A hearing in which extradition to another state is sought;
(6) A proceeding for an inpatient involuntary commitment to a
facility under Part 7 of Article 5 of Chapter 122C of the
General Statutes, or a proceeding for commitment under Part
8 of Article 5 of Chapter 122C of the General Statutes.
(7) In any case of execution against the person under Chapter 1,
Article 28 of the General Statutes, and in any civil arrest and
bail proceeding under Chapter 1, Article 34, of the General
Statutes;
(8) In the case of a juvenile, a hearing as a result of which
commitment to an institution or transfer to the superior court
for trial on a felony charge is possible;
(9) A hearing for revocation of parole at which the right to counsel
is provided in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 148,
Article 4, of the General Statutes;
132 [Vol. 16:127
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.43
The court in Jolly first discussed the statutory aspects of the
issue, and in reviewing the legislative history and case law devel-
opments in the area of the Sixth Amendment right to appointed
counsel, held that N.C.G.S. § 7A-451(a)(1) applied only to criminal
cases.44 The court first looked to their holding in State v. Mor-
ris,4 in which they reviewed the United States Supreme Court
holdings following Gideon v. Wainwright.4' The court in Jolly
stated that N.C.G.S. § 7A-451(a)(1), as adopted by the General
Assembly in 1969, codified the holding of Morris.4v The court next
noted the effect of Argersinger v. Hamlin,48 in which the United
States Supreme Court stated that "absent a knowing and intelli-
gent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense,
(10) A proceeding for sterilization under Chapter 35, Article 7
(Sterilization of Persons Mentally Ill and Mentally Retarded)
of the General Statutes; and
(11) A proceeding for the provision of protective services according
to Chapter 108, Article 4, of the General Statutes;
(12) In the case of a juvenile alleged to be neglected under Chapter
7A, Article 23 of the General Statutes;
(13) A proceeding to find a person incompetent under Subchapter I
of Chapter 35A, of the General Statutes;
(14) A proceeding to terminate parental rights where a guardian
ad litem is appointed pursuant to G.S. 7A-289.23;
(15) An action brought pursuant to Article 24B of Chapter 7A of
the General Statutes to terminate an indigent person's
parental rights.
Id.
43. Jolly, 300 N.C. at 85, 265 S.E.2d at 138. The defendant in Jolly also
asserted a right under the Law of the Land provisions in Article I, Section 19 of
the North Carolina Constitution. Id. The court stated that in the situation in
Jolly, the limitations imposed by this section of the North Carolina Constitution
were identical to those of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 92 n.2, 265 S.E.2d at 142 n.2.
44. Id. at 86, 265 S.E.2d at 139.
45. 275 N.C. 50, 165 S.E.2d 245 (1969).
46. Jolly, 300 N.C. at 87, 265 S.E.2d at 139 (citing State v. Morris, 275 N.C.
50, 165 S.E.2d 245 (1969)).
47. Id. In Morris the court held that the Sixth Amendment right to appointed
counsel applied to all felony and misdemeanor cases in which the authorized
punishment exceeded six months in prison and a $500.00 fine. Id. As first
adopted in 1969, N.C.G.S. § 7A-451(a)(1) read: "Any felony case, and any
misdemeanor case for which the authorized punishment exceeds six months
imprisonment or a five hundred dollar ($500.00) fine...." Id.
48. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
1994]
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whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was
represented by counsel at his trial."49 The court in Jolly stated
that the holding of Argersinger was reflected in the amended ver-
sion of N.C.G.S. § 7A-451(a)(1), in that the wording was changed
to "[a]ny case in which imprisonment or fine of five hundred dol-
lars ($500.00) or more, is likely to be adjudged."50 The court in
Jolly declared that, notwithstanding the amended version of
N.C.G.S. § 7A-451(a)(1) to reflect the holding of Argersinger, this
section only applies to criminal cases.51
The remaining provisions of N.C.G.S. § 7A-451(a)52 were held
in Jolly to not be applicable to an indigent civil contemnor facing
incarceration for nonsupport.5 3 The court applied the maxim,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius-when certain things are
specified in a statute, an intention to exclude all others from its
operation may be inferred-and stated that civil contempt cases
are not included in the statutory list of N.C.G.S. § 7A-451(a).14
Thus the court held that N.C.G.S. § 7A-451(a) did not grant an
49. Jolly, 300 N.C. at 87, 265 S.E.2d at 139 (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972)).
50. Id. at 87, 265 S.E.2d at 139-40. See supra note 42.
51. Jolly, 300 N.C. at 88, 265 S.E.2d at 140. The court concluded that:
[u]se of the phrase "[a]ny case" is responsive to the precise holding of
Argersinger, which states that the Sixth Amendment precludes
imprisonment of a person for "any offense," however classified, unless he
was represented by counsel at his trial. The words "[any case" in G.S.
7A-451(a)(1) must therefore be construed as any criminal case to which
Sixth Amendment protections apply.
Id. at 87-88, 265 S.E.2d at 140.
52. See supra note 42 (text of the statute).
53. Jolly, 300 N.C. at 90, 265 S.E.2d at 141.
54. Id. The court in Jolly noted that two other types of civil cases, execution
against the person, and civil arrest and bail proceedings, listed in subdivision (7),
much like civil contempt, will presumably result in an adjudication of
imprisonment. Id. Therefore, a reading of N.C.G.S. § 7A-451(a)
indicates that in subdivision (1), the legislative intent was to define the
scope of entitlement to appointed counsel in criminal cases, and that in
subdivisions (2) through (13), the intent was to list specifically those
civil proceedings in which appointment of counsel was authorized. The
failure to list civil contempt proceedings in subdivisions (2) through (13)
must be construed as a legislative determination that appointed counsel
for indigents is not authorized in such proceedings.
Id. See also supra note 42 (text of the statute). Section 7A-451(a) was amended
in 1985, adding subdivisions (14) and (15), see supra note 42, which this author
believes, applying the reasoning of the court in Jolly, also do not authorize
appointed counsel in civil contempt proceedings.
134 [Vol. 16:127
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indigent the right to appointed counsel in a civil contempt
proceeding. 55
In discussing the constitutional sources of an indigent's right
to appointed counsel, the court in Jolly noted that the sources are
the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 56
The court looked to the holdings of the Supreme Court of the
United States, specifically Argersinger v. Hamlin5 7 and Gagnon v.
Scarpelli,58 to determine the issue of whether an indigent civil
contemnor has the constitutional right to appointed counsel in a
nonsupport action likely to result in incarceration. 59 The court
noted that the decision of Argersinger held that Sixth Amendment
right to appointed counsel applies in any criminal case where a
defendant may be incarcerated. 60 The argument that the holding
of Argersinger would be improperly limited by distinguishing a
civil proceeding from a criminal proceeding was rejected by The
United States Supreme Court in Gagnon ,61 and it was on this
basis that the North Carolina Supreme Court in Jolly ruled that
"due process requires appointment of counsel for indigents in non-
support civil contempt proceedings only in those cases where
assistance of counsel is necessary for an adequate presentation of
the merits, or to otherwise ensure fundamental fairness."62 In
Jolly, the court noted that, according to Gagnon ,63 the type of pro-
55. Jolly, 300 N.C. at 90, 265 S.E.2d at 141.
56. Id.
57. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
58. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
59. Jolly, 300 N.C. at 90-94, 265 S.E.2d at 141-43.
60. Id. at 90-91, 265 S.E.2d at 141. The United States Supreme Court in
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), qualified the holding of Argersinger.
Argersinger, according to Scott, stated only that a defendant may not be
imprisoned if he was not represented by counsel. Thus, if a defendant is tried
without counsel for a misdemeanor for a petty offense for which the law
prescribes a fine or a jail term, but he is only fined, he has no complaint under
Argersinger. Robert Monk, Comment, The Indigent Defendant's Right to Court-
Appointed Counsel in Civil Contempt Proceedings for Nonpayment of Child
Support, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 326, 329 n.25 (1983) (citing Scott v. Illinois 440 U.S.
367, 373-74 (1979)).
61. Jolly, 300 N.C. at 91, 265 S.E.2d at 141 (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778 (1973)).
62. Id. at 93, 265 S.E.2d at 143.
63. In Gagnon, the United States Supreme Court held that indigent
defendants are not entitled to the automatic appointment of counsel in parole or
probation revocation proceedings. Id. (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973)). The holding in Gagnon regarding the constitutional right to counsel at a
1994] 135
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ceeding under consideration determines whether due process
requires an automatic, or case-by-case, approach to appointment
of counsel.6 4 The court in Jolly stated that, if the proceedings are
informal in nature and the legal and factual issues are not com-
plex, then minimum requirements of due process may be satisfied
by evaluating the need for counsel on a case-by-case basis.65 The
court held that the legal and factual issues for indigents in non-
support contempt cases are neither numerous nor complex.66
Therefore, the court in Jolly declared that, because a nonsupport
civil contempt case is usually not complex, due process does not
require that counsel be automatically appointed for indigents in
those cases, but rather that a case-by-case evaluation as to the
needs of counsel is sufficient to meet the minimal requirements of
due process.67
Lastly, the court in Jolly, inquiring into the nature of civil
contempt, 8 stated that a right to counsel in a civil contempt
action would evolve from the Due Process Clause of the Four-
probation revocation proceeding has been superseded in North Carolina by N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-1345(e) (1988). The statute entitles an indigent criminal to
have counsel appointed at a probation revocation hearing, and is "intended to go
beyond the federal constitutional right to counsel enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli." State v. Coltrane, 307 N.C. 511,
514, 299 S.E.2d 199, 201 (1983).
64. Jolly, 300 N.C. at 91, 265 S.E.2d at 142.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 93, 265 S.E.2d at 143.
67. Id. The court's reasons for finding nonsupport proceedings non-complex
were that a contemnor's obligation to pay child support has been previously
adjudicated and that existence of the court order obligating payment of the child
support can be determined by reference to court records. Id. Also, the court
noted that establishment of arrearages is a simple bookkeeping matter and often
not subject to dispute. Id. The court concluded that "[ilnquiries as to whether
the purpose of the order may still be served by compliance, defendant's ability to
pay, reasons for the arrearage and mitigating circumstances normally are not
complicated." Id.
68. The court stated that civil contempt proceedings are always civil in
nature. Jolly, 300 N.C. at 92, 265 S.E.2d at 142. The court looked to N.C.G.S.
§ 5A-21 and its Official Commentary, see generally supra note 3 (text of North
Carolina's civil contempt statute), to determine that the purpose of civil
contempt is not to punish but rather to use the court's power to impose fines or
imprisonment as a method to coerce the defendant to comply with an order of the
court. Jolly, 300 N.C. at 92, 265 S.E.2d at 142. The court noted that the coercive
nature of civil contempt can be illustrated by the image of the jailed defendant,
who by virtue of his ability to comply with the court order, "carries 'the keys of
his prison in his own pockets.'" Id.
[Vol. 16:127
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teenth Amendment, unlike a defendant's right to counsel in a
criminal action, which it stated arises from the Sixth Amendment
and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9
B. Status of the Law Outside North Carolina Prior to McBride
Subsequent to the North Carolina Supreme Court's holding in
Jolly v. Wright,v° the United States Supreme Court decided the
case of Lassiter v. Department of Social Services 71 in which the
Court again addressed the issue of the right to counsel under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Although the holding of Lassiter stated
that due process does not require automatic appointment of coun-
sel in a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the Court's analy-
sis provided the framework for the North Carolina Supreme
Court's holding in McBride v. McBride.7 2 Apart from the Supreme
Court's holding in Lassiter, the court in McBride was influenced
by the decisions of the many jurisdictions which addressed the
question of the indigent civil contemnor's right to automatic
appointment of counsel in a nonsupport hearing likely to result in
incarceration.73
The circuits of the United States Courts of Appeals which
have addressed this question have unanimously determinbd that
due process requires an automatic appointment of counsel for an
indigent facing incarceration in a civil contempt proceeding. 74
Similarly, the majority of states which have decided this issue
have reached the same conclusion. 75 Additionally, several of the
69. Jolly, 300 N.C. at 92, 265 S.E.2d at 142.
70. 300 N.C. 83, 265 S.E.2d 135 (1980).
71. 452 U.S. 18 (1981), reh'g denied, 453 U.S. 927 (1981).
72. 334 N.C. 124, 126, 431 S.E.2d 14, 16 (1993). See infra text accompanying
notes 80-84.
73. McBride, 334 N.C. at 129, 431 S.E.2d at 18.
74. Id. at 128, 431 S.E.2d at 17. The following cases provide that due process
requires an automatic appointment of counsel for an indigent facing
incarceration in a civil contempt proceeding: United States v. Bobart Travel
Agency, Inc., 699 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir.
1973); Ridgway v. Baker, 720 F.2d 1409 (5th Cir. 1983); Sevier v. Turner, 742
F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Anderson, 553 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir.
1977) (per curiam); Henkel v. Bradshaw, 483 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1973); Walker
v. McLain, 768 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1061 (1986).
75. McBride, 334 N.C. at 128-29, 431 S.E.2d at 17-18. The following
jurisdictions provide that due process requires an automatic appointment of
counsel for an indigent facing incarceration in a civil contempt proceeding: Otton
v. Zaborac, 525 P.2d 537 (Alaska 1974); County of Santa Clara v. Santa Clara
County Super. Ct., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Padilla v. Padilla, 645
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states which hold that due process does not require automatic
appointment of counsel, declare that indigent civil contemnors,
who are unable to pay the amount of support owed, can not be
incarcerated for their failure to pay, and as such are not being
denied any liberty protected by the due process provisions.76
Thus, the clear trend of the federal and state case law preceding
the North Carolina Supreme Court decision in McBride v.
McBride was to interpret due process to require the appointment
of counsel to an indigent civil contemnor facing incarceration in a
nonsupport proceeding. The supreme court acknowledged this
trend in McBride, and reevaluated its position on this issue in
light of the changes in the law since Jolly v. Wright. The court
concluded in McBride that the decision set forth in Jolly was to be
overruled.77
P.2d 1327 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); Dube v. Lopes, 481 A.2d 1293 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1984); In re Marriage of Stariha, 509 N.E.2d 1117 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); McNabb
v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9 (Iowa 1982); Johnson v. Johnson, 721 P.2d 290
(Kan. Ct. App. 1986); Rutherford v. Rutherford, 464 A.2d 228 (Md. 1983); Mead
v. Batchlor, 460 N.W.2d 493 (Mich. 1990); Cox v. Slama, 355 N.W.2d 401 (Minn.
1984); Carroll v. Moore, 423 N.W.2d 757 (Neb. 1988); State ex rel. Gullickson v.
Gruchalla, 467 N.W.2d 451 (N.D. 1991); In re Marriage of Gorger, 728 P.2d 104
(Or. Ct. App. 1986); Bradford v. Bradford, 1986 WL 2874 (Tenn. Ct. App.); Ex
parte Gunther, 758 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. 1988); Tetro v. Tetro, 544 P.2d 17 (Wash.
1975); Smoot v. Dingess, 236 S.E.2d 468 (W. Va. 1977); Ferris v. State ex rel.
Maass, 249 N.W.2d 789 (Wis. 1977). However, the following jurisdictions provide
that there is no due process right of counsel for indigent contemnors in
nonsupport civil proceedings: State ex rel. Payne v. Empire Life Ins. Co., 351 So.
2d 538 (Ala. 1977); Andrews v. Walton, 428 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1983); In re Marriage
of Betts, 558 N.E.2d 404 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); State v. Walker, 386 So. 2d 908 (La.
1980); Meyer v. Meyer, 414 A.2d 236 (Me. 1980); State ex rel. Shaw v. Provaznik,
708 S.W.2d 337 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Duval v. Duval, 322 A.2d 1 (N.H. 1974);
State ex rel. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Rael, 642 P.2d 1099 (N.M. 1982);
Morgenthau v. Garcia, 561 N.Y.S.2d 867 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990); In re Calhoun, 350
N.E.2d 665 (Ohio 1976); Rittel v. Rittel, 485 A.2d 30 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
76. Andrews v. Walton, 428 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1983); State ex rel. Shaw v.
Provaznik, 708 S.W.2d 337 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). North Carolina has a similar
provision in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-21(a)(3) (1986), see supra note 3 (text of the
statute), but notwithstanding this provision, the court in McBride determined
there is a need for automatic appointment of counsel for indigents in these
situations. McBride, 334 N.C. at 131, 431 S.E.2d at 19. See infra text
accompanying notes 90-97.
77. McBride, 334 N.C. at 131, 431 S.E.2d at 19.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. McBride v. McBride
In McBride v. McBride," the Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina was again asked to contemplate the issue of whether an indi-
gent defendant has a constitutional due process right to appointed
counsel in a civil contempt hearing for nonsupport in which he
faces a possibility of incarceration. In McBride, the court took
note of the altered legal landscape surrounding this issue since
their decision in Jolly v. Wright"9 and, accordingly, examined the
issue under the guidance of the United State Supreme Court's
decision in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services.8 0
The court in McBride reasoned that the holding of Lassiter
emphasizes that a court, in determining whether due process
requires the appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant in a
particular proceeding, must first focus on the potential diminish-
ment of the indigent's personal liberty, rather than on the "civil"
or "criminal" label placed on the proceeding.81 The court stated
that "[w]here due process is concerned, 'it is the defendant's inter-
est in personal freedom ... which triggers the right to appointed
counsel.'"8 2 McBride noted that the Court in Lassiter concluded
that there is a presumption that an indigent has "a right to
appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his
physical liberty." 3 For this reason, the court in McBride con-
cluded that the principles of due process in the Fourteenth
Amendment required the trial court to apply the presumption in
favor of Mr. McBride in the hearing which resulted in his incarcer-
ation.8 4 The court pronounced that "[t]he private interest at stake
in the present case is, perhaps, the most fundamental interest
78. 334 N.C. 124, 431 S.E.2d 14 (1993).
79. 300 N.C. 83, 265 S.E.2d 135 (1980).
80. McBride, 334 N.C. at 126, 431 S.E.2d at 16 (citing Lassiter v. Dep't of
Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981), reh'g denied, 453 U.S. 927 (1981)). Although
Lassiter held that there was no due process requirement of automatic
appointment of counsel in a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the court in
McBride stated that the Supreme Court's analysis in Lassiter was instructive
with regard to the analysis they had to apply in addressing the issue in the case
sub judice. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. (quoting Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981), reh'g
denied, 453 U.S. 927 (1981)).
83. Id. at 127, 431 S.E.2d at 16 (quoting Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Servs., 452
U.S. 18 (1981), reh'g denied, 453 U.S. 927 (1981)).
84. Id. at 130, 431 S.E.2d at 18.
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protected by the Constitution of the United States - - the interest
in personal liberty."8 5 It noted that an indigent civil contemnor
incarcerated for nonsupport does not "hold the keys to the jail" if
he is unable to pay the child support arrearages which would pro-
vide his release, 8 and that in such situations, the deprivation of
liberty that occurs is tremendous notwithstanding the fact that a
civil contempt order contains a purge clause allowing for the con-
temnor's release upon payment of the arrearages5 7 Therefore, in
conclusion, the court in McBride held "that principles of due pro-
cess embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment require that, absent
the appointment of counsel, indigent civil contemnors may not be
incarcerated for failure to pay child support arrearages."s s The
court also stated that, to the extent that Jolly v. Wright is incon-
sistent with the holding of McBride, Jolly is overruled. 9 By
reversing the holding in Jolly, the North Carolina Supreme Court,
in McBride, joined the majority of other jurisdictions which have
decided this issue.9 0
B. Incarceration of Those Without the Present Ability to Comply
With a Court Order
The court in McBride was particularly concerned with the
incarceration of indigent civil contemnors who do not have the
present ability to pay their child support arrearages. The court
noted that although it is true that a civil contemnor should not be
fined or incarcerated for failure to comply with a court order with-
out a determination by the trial court that the contemnor is pres-
85. Id.
86. Id. See supra note 68.
87. McBride, 334 N.C. at 130, 431 S.E.2d at 18. See supra notes 18 and 19.
88. McBride, 334 N.C. at 131, 431 S.E.2d at 19. The court set forth the
procedure to be followed to effectuate this holding. It stated:
At the outset of a civil contempt proceeding for nonsupport, the trial
court should assess the likelihood that the defendant may be
incarcerated. If the court determines that the defendant may be
incarcerated as a result of the proceeding, the trial court should, in the
interest of judicial economy, inquire into the defendant's desire to be
represented by counsel and into his ability to pay for legal
representation. If such a defendant wishes representation but is unable
due to his indigence to pay for such representation, the trial court must
appoint counsel to represent him.
Id. at 132, 431 S.E.2d at 19.
89. Id. at 131, 431 S.E.2d at 19.
90. See supra notes 74 and 75.
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ently able to comply,91 the facts of the McBride case reveal that
trial courts do not always make this determination before incar-
cerating the civil contemnor. 92 The trial courts are statutorily
bound to not incarcerate a civil contemnor who does not have the
present ability to comply with the court order.93 If a trial court
fails to determine a civil contemnor's present ability to pay, it may
result in the incarceration of an indigent who has no means to
obtain his release, and who could be incarcerated for an indeter-
minate length of time.94
The court in McBride sought to curtail what it perceived as a
problem at the trial court level, notwithstanding the statutory
requirements-making the proper determination of whether an
unrepresented civil contemnor has the present ability to comply
with the court order. 95 The court wanted to assure that an indi-
gent civil contemnor is aware of the fact that one may not be
incarcerated for want of the present ability to comply with the
court order.96 Additionally, the court wanted to make certain that
indigents know how to prove their inability to pay.9 7 The court in
McBride stated that an attorney would raise these issues on
behalf of an indigent civil contemnor, and that "experience has
now shown that absent appointed counsel for indigent defendants
91. McBride, 334 N.C. at 130, 431 S.E.2d at 18 (citing Jolly v. Wright, 300
N.C. 83, 92, 265 S.E.2d 135, 142 (1980)).
92. Id.
93. See supra note 3.
94. McBride, 334 N.C. at 130, 431 S.E.2d at 18. In a situation involving these
circumstances, it has been stated that it is "absurd to distinguish criminal and
civil incarceration; from the prospective of the person incarcerated, the jail is just
as bleak no matter which label is used." Id. at 130, 431 S.E.2d at 19 (quoting
Walker v. McLain, 768 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1061
(1986)). See also supra note 17.
95. McBride, 334 N.C. at 131 n.4, 431 S.E.2d at 19 n.4. The court noted in
dicta that an examination of civil contempt cases heard by the state's appellate
courts indicated that a "failure of trial courts to make a determination of a
contemnor's ability to comply is not altogether infrequent." Id.
96. Id. at 131, 431 S.E.2d at 19. The court stated:
indigent defendants faced with imprisonment in a civil contempt
proceeding for nonpayment of child support could avoid imprisonment if
they showed that they were unable to pay the amount of child support
owed at the time of the hearing. However, as the present case
illustrates, indigent defendants often are unaware of this fact.
Id.
97. Id. The court noted that without an attorney, "many such defendants
would not know how to prove their inability to pay." Id.
1994]
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in civil contempt proceedings, the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of personal liberty is high.""8
The decision in McBride should lead to a reduction in the
actual number of indigent civil contemnors being incarcerated.
Simply by virtue of the automatic right to appointment of counsel,
the indigent will be more readily able to present proof of any
inability to comply with the court order, thus precluding incarcer-
ation without knowledge of the rights provided by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
C. Effects of, and Unanswered Questions After, McBride
In addition to reducing the number of indigent civil defend-
ants being incarcerated, the most apparent effect of McBride v.
McBride will be an increase in the number of counsel appointed to
represent indigent civil contemnors in nonsupport proceedings. 99
The state provides the funding for counsel assigned to represent
indigents, 100 and the effect of McBride on the payment of such
counsel is yet to be determined. 1 10
Another, more critical, effect of McBride that is yet to be
determined, is the efficiency with which the trial courts will follow
the procedure for making a determination of when to appoint
counsel as set forth in McBride.102 It can only be presumed that
the trial courts will correctly administer the scheme, but the court
in McBride was concerned with the trial courts' failure to deter-
mine an indigent's present ability to comply with a court order,10 3
and noted that failure to make such a determination was not that
infrequent. 10 4
The Supreme Court of North Carolina in McBride did not dis-
cuss the statutory provisions entitling indigents to services of
counsel in certain actions, as it did previously in Jolly v.
98. Id.
99. At the time of the decision in McBride, assignments of counsel to Central
Carolina Legal Services of Guilford County, North Carolina, which represented
Mr. McBride, were averaging between two and three per week for this one county
only. Fees per assignment were averaging between $250.00 and $300.00. There
was no specific data as to changes in these figures since McBride. Telephone
Interview with Stanley B. Sprague, defendant's attorney, Central Carolina Legal
Services (Sept. 28, 1993).
100. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-452(b) (1989).
101. See supra note 99.
102. See supra note 88.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 91-98.
104. See supra note 95.
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Wright,10 5 nor was it necessary to do so, for the decision was based
on the due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment." 6 It
remains to be seen, however, whether the North Carolina Legisla-
ture will amend the statutory provisions to reflect the holding of
McBride, and thereby statutorily declare an indigent civil contem-
nor's right to appointed counsel in a nonsupport proceeding. The
legislature previously amended N.C.G.S. § 7A-451,107 following
the United States Supreme Court decision in Argersinger v. Ham-
lin,1081 to reflect the expansion of an indigent's right to appointed
counsel as declared in that case. 10 9 Should the legislature choose
to amend N.C.G.S. § 7A-451, it will serve to solidify the holding of
McBride, and reduce much of the scrutiny which will be directed
toward the trial courts with respect to the determination of when
to appoint counsel.
Finally, in Jolly v. Wright, 01 the court stated that it was lim-
iting its holding to the "precise questions posed.""' In contrast,
the McBride court did not explicitly limit its holding, and whether
it will be extended to cover other civil contempt proceedings is
unclear. Other civil contempt proceedings which may result in
incarceration include: domestic relations cases where one has
failed to comply with a marital settlement agreement or decree;
failure to attend a court ordered deposition; and, failure to comply
with pendente lite alimony orders. 1 2 It is probable that the hold-
ing in McBride could be extended to pendente lite civil contempt
proceedings, because the material elements are very similar to
those litigated in McBride.1" 3 However, one's indigence has little
effect on the other two aforementioned civil contempt situations,
105. 300 N.C. 83, 265 S.E.2d 135 (1980). See supra text accompanying notes
44-55.
106. McBride v. McBride, 334 N.C. 124, 431 S.E.2d 14 (1993).
107. See supra note 42.
108. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
109. See supra text accompanying note 50.
110. 300 N.C. 83, 265 S.E.2d 135 (1980).
111. Id. at 94, 265 S.E.2d at 143.
112. Michele Hermann & Shannon Donahue, Fathers Behind Bars: The Right
to Counsel in Civil Contempt Proceedings, 14 N.M. L. REV. 275, 276 (1984).
113. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-16.3-16.8 (1987). The alimony and
pendente lite statutes set forth specific enforcement procedures, and remedies
available, to the dependent spouse, and state that enforcement is available
through civil contempt proceedings, and that disobedience may be punished by
criminal contempt proceedings. Id. The statutes set forth no provisions specific
to indigents, but do allow for modification of the order due to changed
circumstances. Id.
1994] 143
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and, therefore, it appears less probable that the holding in
McBride will be extended to cover these circumstances. These
questions will be determined if and when a case arises under
these circumstances asserting the holding of McBride, or in the
unlikely event that the legislature chooses to address them.
Regardless of the unanswered questions presented by
McBride, the court made the correct determination in overruling
Jolly. The trend, as evidenced by the decisions of the federal cir-
cuits and the numerous state courts, is to expand the due process
rights of the Fourteenth Amendment to include the loss of liberty
that an indigent may face in a civil contempt proceeding. Pro-
vided that there is often a hazy line of distinction in North Caro-
lina between civil and criminal contempt," 4 it is certainly
equitable to extend the rights enjoyed by an indigent criminal con-
temnor to an indigent civil contemnor.
V. CONCLUSION
In McBride v. McBride, the North Carolina Supreme Court
revisited the question of whether an indigent civil contemnor fac-
ing incarceration for the failure to pay child support arrearages
has the constitutional due process right to be represented by
appointed counsel. The court overruled its prior decision in Jolly
v. Wright and declared that such a right does exist in North Caro-
lina. The court based its decision in McBride on the development
of the legal landscape involving due process rights of civil con-
temnors since the earlier holding of Jolly. The court looked to the
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court and the federal cir-
cuits of appeal, as well as to the holdings of the majority of the
states which have decided this issue. Moreover, in McBride the
court looked at the status of the law in North Carolina, and found
that indigent defendants in nonsupport civil contempt proceedings
were being denied their physical liberties as protected by the Con-
stitution of the United States. The court ruled that this denial of
liberty without the ability to afford representation of counsel vio-
lated the due process provisions with respect to indigents,
notwithstanding that their contempt was civil in nature. As a
result of McBride, indigent civil contemnors will be appointed
counsel in all nonsupport actions which may result in incarcera-
tion. Absent an appointment of counsel by the trial court, an indi-
gent civil contemnor may not be incarcerated for a failure to pay
114. See supra notes 14 and 40.
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child support arrearages. Therefore, notwithstanding the incapa-
bility of affording counsel, an indigent civil contemnor will not be
denied representation in a nonsupport hearing which might lead
to imprisonment, resulting in greater protection for the contemnor
and an increased capacity to provide proof of a present inability to
comply with a court order, and, in the end, a reduction in the
number of civil contemnors unjustly incarcerated.
Kurt F. Hausler
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